Phishers frequently craft novel deceptions on their websites and circumvent existing antiphishing techniques for insecure intrusions, users' digital identity theft, and then illegal profits. This raises the needs to incorporate new features for detecting novel phish websites and optimizing the existing anti-phishing techniques. In this light, 58 new hybrid features were proposed in this paper and their prediction susceptibilities were evaluated by using feature co-occurrence criterion and a baseline machine learning algorithm. Empirical test and analysis showed the significant outcomes of the proposed features on detection performance. As a result, the most influential features are identified, and new insights are offered for further detection improvement.
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the web data flow has shown a rapid expansion of phish websites that practically lure targeting users to acquire their own sensitive information by masquerading them as a trustworthy entity in the web environment. Phish website is a form of phishing, where phishers imitate a legitimate website by exploiting specific deceptions and innovative social tactics for digital identity theft and then monetary gains [1] [2] [3] . To intuitively tackle phish websites, researchers have introduced numerous anti-phishing techniques and involved various detection methods such as nonclassification and classification based methods those assisted by different features [1] [2] [3] [4] . In the literature of anti-phishing, the classification based methods outperformed the others due to the use of machine learning and data mining algorithms. However, there is still high false detection errors causing inaccurate detection against novel phish website. Phishers often evolve novel phish websites exploiting new and more sophisticated deceptions to bypass the aforesaid detection methods for more insecure intrusions, identity theft and illegal profits [4, 5] . Hence, the steady escalating of novel phish websites becomes the most intricate issue needs to be considered seriously [3, 4, 5] . For the problem at hand, this paper has made the following contributions: (i) this paper proposes new, hybrid and predictive features for detecting those novel phish websites, (ii) an experimental strategy has been conducted by using an optimized assessment criterion in order to identify features' prediction susceptibility and analyse features' influence on detection performance. More precisely, the proposed features encompasses a hybridity of web page content and web page URL features. Furthermore, they leveraged the most dynamic attributes that phishers could use to impersonate their targeting legitimate websites such as those of embedded objects, cross site scripting, and those crafted in URLs hosting non-English webpages. It is hoped that contributions has been made by this paper would help researchers in the field of phishing mitigation with a great knowledge and understanding about the causality between the features proposed herewith, their prediction potentials, and the overall detection performance on novel phish websites as well as those prevalent ones. The remaining sections of this paper are as follows: Section 2 presents a background of phishing and antiphishing, commonly used features along with related works. Section 3 states the developed methodology that pursued in this work. Then, Section 4 presents the dedicated experimental strategy, the experimental dataset, and the results along with a deep discussion and comparative analysis. Also, it synthesizes several implications for future work. Section 5 outlooks on the proposed features and developed classification methodology, draws conclusions.
The State-of-The-Art

Phishing and Anti-Phishing
It is well known that phishing is a form of online fraud to acquire the Internet users' confidential and personal information through the identification theft for financial gains. Typically, the phishers accomplish this fraudulent process in a strategic manner with the aid of a spoofed email or fake website along with a social engineering tactic [6] . According [7] a phish website is any web page that impersonates illegally a trustworthy website and it is crafted on the behalf of a third party (phisher) who intends to confuse users and acquire their credentials for fraud activity and illegal profits. Radical escalating of phish websites on the Web causes direct losses (e.g. financial loss and identity theft) to the users and enterprises and indirect losses (e,g. impacts on customer's trust in an online service, or e-banking transaction, or reputation of a financial organization and brand). To this end, many researchers have applied different anti-phishing techniques to combat phishing activities and mitigate their damages particularly over the last few years. Researchers' developments varied in their deployments including detection methods, features and information sources. To give an insight on such detective methods, they were categorized into non-classification and classification based methods, and each category was decomposed into sub-categories such as blacklist and whitelist methods, machine learning classifiers and data mining methods, hybrid, and information-flow methods [8, 9, 10] . Among all the aforesaid categories and subcategories, the classification methods outperform their competitors due to the integration of features and machine learning classifiers or data mining rules to build effective phishing classification models. Therefore, researchers continually develop their achievements with the aid of classification methods by optimizing their inductive bias and extending the features in use towards obtaining a holistic characterization on phishing deceptions with minimal detection errors.
Phishing Deceptive Features
In the light of classification methods, prior researchers have deployed different types of features for phishing detection on websites. Deployed features were varied from static to dynamic features due to their nature and the source of extraction. Static features can be extracted from the webpage source and URL without full execution of the web page itself. Whereas, dynamic features can be retrieved during the webpage source rendering and execution [8, 9, 10] . Consequently, the deployed features have made different discriminative contributions at predicting phishing susceptibility. Some feature might being noninformative and irrelevant to phishing class, and then they might negatively influence the overall effectiveness of classification method [11] . That is the most intricate issue encountered with the utilization of classification based methods. On the other hand, phishers often advance their deceptions and exploit more innovative ones to bypass the existing antiphishing campaigns. Example of such evolutionary features are those of specific embedded and dynamic objects, host files, domain names and top level domains, and cross site scripting codes. Phishers craft such kinds of features on websites to inject malicious codes, harvest passwords, and redirect the visiting users to fake websites. Moreover, advancement of phishers' deceptions involved exploiting URLs of trustworthy websites hosting with different natural languages rather than English [2, [11] [12] [13] . As such, they are being able to evade anti-phishing techniques relied on textual features exclusively. As a result, the aforesaid evolutionary types of features yield misclassification costs, and then more potential security risks and monetary losses. Day after day, evolutionary features become the key challenge versus effective antiphishing techniques assisted by machine learning methods [11, 14, 15] . Such challenge is emerged as the most salient research agenda which demands persistent exploration of new deployments to promote existing generations of features. Beyond this, it is essential to find out highly discriminative features for accurate classification on phish and non-phish web sites. Examples of evolutionary features that have been deployed in the literature are categorized and displayed in Figure 1 . Also, the relevant issues of each feature category is depicted briefly in Table 1 .
Related Work
Classification based detection methods were developed for intuitive filtering and protection against phish websites, therefore, they were heavily applied to the client-side level in between the interaction of users with web environment. In this context, Table 2 enlists examples of such client side filters along with their relative merits and demerits. Regarding Table 2 , a hybrid based anti-phishing tool, Google Toolbar, was presented to incorporate an upgraded Google phishing blacklist with a machine learning classifier [7] . In [16] , phishing filtering was devoted using textual and DOM objects features alongside Support Vector machine classifier (SVM). Two key components are involved in filtering, they are information retrieval algorithm to extract textual features and Chi-squared criterion to select the most discriminative ones. Another example is PhishGuard [17] , it was asserted to keep track users' submissions and their bogus credentials during login activities. Meanwhile, B-APT [18] , was adopted to filter websites of US financial institutions exclusively. It relied on Bayesian filter and a whitelist of examining tokens and objects to identify phishing websites. Later, Bogus Bitter was developed by [19] to deliver a plenty of bogus credentials along with those actual ones as a way to keep track phish websites. Whereas, PhishTester was developed to mitigate cross site scripting phish attacks exclusively by exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers and detecting suspicious codes through the flow of information [9, 20] . In contrast, PhishNet was attained in [21] as an upgraded blacklist with a classifier and new URL features in order to proof-check whether an examined URL useful for resolving DNS lookup. Then, an evolutionary hybrid anti-phishing tool (PhishBlock) was developed and introduced in [22] for classifying the phishness of URL and textual features extracted from examined websites. Meanwhile, CANTINA + was proposed by some researchers working at Carnegie Mellon University as an extensible CANTINA with extra discriminative features. CANTINA + was developed to involve an information flow mechanism along with machine learning classifiers for better filtering on novel phishing attacks [23] . Whereas, AIWL was an automated individual whitelist built in browsers to protect users during online transaction [24] . Overall the aforesaid phishing filters, have several outstanding issues in leveraging evolving phish websites particularly those crafted with cross site scripting (XSS) features, embedded objects based features, and newly exploited URLs of non-English hosted webpages (Table 2) . Therefore, further efforts should be dedicated to explore new features with high prediction susceptibility for holistic characterization and accurate classification on novel phishes. This, in turn, will improve the effectiveness of existing anti-phishing techniques with minimal computations, misclassification cost, false alarms, and performance overhead.
METHODOLOGY
This section articulates the solution to the problems at hand through four steps, website analysis, features extraction, features assessment and phishing classification.
Website Analysis
To extract a hybrid set of features from web page content and URL, the relevant components and parts in the web page source code were parsed, and a Document Object Model (DOM) tree was constructed as the node-based representation of the examined web page. In fact, Document Object Model (DOM) is a standard platform of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) that allows dynamical access to the webpage's content, structure and style by programs and scripts [34] . DOM tree includes nodes denoting different components of the webpage that they could be rendered as a rooted tree with nodes, and each node represents a constituent tag [34] . By this way, all components, elements, attributes and textual parts are represented by the leaf nodes of DOM tree.
The webpage source code represents the starting node or the root of DOM tree, and then the DOM tree continues to extend its branches to the lowest level, where all the leaf nodes exist ( Figure 2 ). Then, the constructed DOM tree is treated as a graph G (V, E) in which any two vertices are connected by exactly one path in order to extract the wanted features [33] [34] [35] . The set of vertices in the graph represents the set of nodes in the DOM tree signifying the set of tags in the webpage source code. To extract URL features, the webpage URL was tokenized into terms including lexical features, tokens, specific irregularities and structural elements. To retrieve the required features during the tokenization process, the classic TF-IDF metric was used as per Equation (1) [25] :
Where term frequency tf(w) indicates the count of occurrences of w in the webpage, inverse document frequency idf(w) represents the general importance of w in the whole collection and w is the term in query. Then, a feature vector was generated so that each webpage , a vector of multiple features = { ,1 , … , .| | } where| |, is the total number of extracted features from that webpage. Each feature , returned either a binary value or a numeric value. The binary values are computed as the union of their corresponding feature's values, while the numeric features in their values are combined by taking the average value of the corresponding features. Finally, the obtained feature vectors were combined into a multi-dimensional vector (Feature Matrix) to include all the extracted feature vectors corresponding to all web pages in the training set. Also, the corresponding webpage class label (phish or nonphish) was set in the first column of each row in the feature matrix.
Features Extraction
Novel deceptive features may rely highly on some embedded components and scripts in the webpage' source code as well as lexical and structural token in the webpage URL address [11, 14, 20, 23] . Thus, these features are categorized based on the parts from where they can be extracted as explained below: A. Embedded objects and features: specific components with their objects and attributes exist inside their relative HTML parts and tags. They can be exploited by phishers for their powerful functionality to imitate the webpage content, insert and hide forged content and external links for redirection to fake websites. Furthermore, phishers make these objects invisible to avoid phish detection mechanisms that leverage traditional webpage content features rather than these features (Table 3 ) [25, 26] . B. Cross site scripting (XSS) features: they are exploited by phishers as a type of deceptions that enables them to hide, inject and deliver doubtful and malicious scripts to the client side by using client side scripting languages. Further, they are exploited to defeat existing antiphishing techniques aiming at severe security risks because they can be interpreted by web browsers [9, 20, 27] . Basically, most of these features can be extracted from script tags involving code pieces, calls and their events, and the native JavaScript functions, etc. (Table  3 ). C. Language independent features: phishers usually use certain features and modification on URLs to host phish websites that imitate legitimate ones. Regarding the literature, it is very common for potential phishing URLs to contain terms, irregularities, and indicators that have been used for estimating phishing susceptibility in websites [28] [29] [30] [31] as presented in Table 3 . 
Features Assessment
To assess the prediction susceptibility of the proposed features, co-occurrence criterion was computed. The co-occurrence calculation relies on an optimized equation of that adopted in [16] . Assume that ∀ ∈ and ∀ ∈ . , is set as the number of occurrences of f in d and , is set as the number of occurrence of each f in D, where D is the set of all the examined instances and F is the set of features belonging to each instance d in D. Then, the co-occurrence calculation is defined as per Equation (2) [32]:
In the case of our study, novel phishing features could belong to valid phish and not valid phish (suspicious) web pages rather than phish web pages exclusively. Hence, we re-present the aforesaid criterion in terms of valid phish, (D) and not valid phish (D'). then, the co-occurrence value of each extracted feature f is computed as follows: 
Phishing Classification
SVM classifier is the most commonly used machine learning classifier to obtain the optimal separating hyper plane between two classes [35] [36] [37] . It guarantees the lowest level of error rate because of its generalization ability and handling of high dimensional feature space. SVM classifier produces two output classes [35] [36] [37] represented by two labels (+1) and (-1) to induct the class of a given feature vector whether it is phishing or not phishing. To do so, V is a feature matrix denotes all the webpages in the learning dataset such that Each Vj is labelled by ∈ {1, −1} with = 1 and = −1 which indicates the membership of Vj in the (class 1) and (class 2) as per Equation (4) [36, 37] .
Where and b are obtained by a quadratic algorithm, V′ is the unlabeled webpage and is the feature vector of a training webpage. The function ( ′, ) maps the space of input webpage to higher dimensions where training webpages in the dataset are learned individually. As such, the classifier assessed the relevance of the input feature established an inductive function Y = f(V, γ) to induct its class as either phish or legitimate.
After applying the induction function on all feature vectors included F during the training task, a feature base classifier was obtained for further classification on a given tested web page during the testing task. Features were extracted from the incoming webpage and being represented as a feature vector Vnew. Then, it was learnt with feature base classifier to produce its class label ′ as either phish or legitimate [35] [36] [37] . Typically, an illustration of the overall classification scenario which adopted from [35] [36] [37] is presented in Figure 3 . 
Evaluation Metrics
To demonstrate the outcomes of the proposed features and their categories to phish website detection performance, some primarily used metrics in the domain of phishing detection are utilized as they presented herewith. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The main aim of any hybrid anti-phishing technique is to explore more sophisticated features, propose predictive ones, and deploy them for distinguishing phish and legitimate websites. To this end, this section presents the strategy that this research pursued to extract, classify and assess the proposed features as illustrated in Figure 4 . Two main steps were followed: features extraction step, and phishness induction step. In between, an assessment step was included to assess the extracted features with respect to their prediction susceptibility for phishing classification using co-occurrence criterion and machine learning classifier on the experimental dataset. Features extraction step deals with analysing the website content to extract the wanted features from the relevant parts and components of any input website as aforesaid in Section 3.0 (Table 3) . While, phishness induction step, applies the machine learning classifier (SVM) to learn the given feature matrix. This could approve the decision on whether the newly extracted hybrid features are able to distinguish the input websites as a novel or legitimate phish. Mainly, most of anti-phishing techniques as those were discussed here were trying to map an input web data to an output data using a specific induction rules. Experimentally, the most publically known machine learning and data mining tool WEKA from the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) was utilized to apply SVM classifier.
Experimental Dataset
Generally, a preliminary set webpages including 16000 webpages of different exploits with 9600 living phish and 6400 legitimate webpages. Webpages were collected during 1 st September 2015 and 1 st November 2016 from different sources. All webpages were retrieved from three publically available data repositories; Phish Tank and Castle Cops (for valid phish and non-valid phish web pages), and Alexa's top sites archive (for legitimate web pages). Such data sources were commonly used in the literature due to some reasons. In PhishTank, the novel phish websites were reported periodically, but some of them were inaccessible once their short life span was expired.
Whereas, phish webpages reported by CastleCops archive included old and novel phishes whose source code files could be accessible and rendered [6, 24] . Also, some non-valid phish web pages were retrieved from datasets adopted in recently published works [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . This is due to their possibility to encompass novel phish variants since the referring related works stated that they were classified as suspicious web pages (Yet, not validated as phishes).
Particularly, as enlisted in Table 4 , the collected webpages involved imbalanced volumes of phish to non-phish webpages. Also, they varied in terms of their exploits like login forms, homepages, end-up web pages, redirecting web pages. The collected web pages involved those hosted in URLs of Chinese and French websites with Chinese and French languages as well as those in English language. Moreover, the collected web pages involve those of the most targeting industries by phishers such as financial organizations, retail services, payments services, governmental organizations and social networking. 
Experimental Results
All the extracted hybrid features are enlisted in Appendix A in terms of their indexes, categories and values. The extracted features with their indexes were later used in the assessment of prediction susceptibility, and the novel phishness induction and its performance assessment. Extracted features are assessed in the form of their co-occurrence over the experimental collection of web pages (dataset). It is revealed that a feature of high co-occurrence score is expected to be crafted as novel phish feature. Co-occurrence scores of extracted features are enlisted in Table 5 along with their relevant features that were indexed (from F1 to F58) and categorized into three feature groups: Group1 for embedded objects category, Group2 for XSS category, and Group 3 for language independent features. Figure 5 plots the trendline of all features along with their relevant groups to showcase the diversity of their frequency over the experimental dataset. On the other hand, the extracted features showed up divergent contributions in the form of their classification potentials such that each feature group showed particular classification rates on the experimental dataset. Moreover, all features of the examined groups are compacted to the group of hybrid features (Group 4) which was also learnt over the experimental dataset. This experiment was conducted to investigate the discriminating power of Group4 and whether it may surpass its competitors in phishing classification. Experimental results are plotted in graphs of Figures 6 and 7.
Discussion
Co-occurrence scores of examined features as presented in Table 5 , and their variations as clearly shown in Figure 5 , inferred the following observations:
i. F1 (Number of Scripting.FileSystemObject) in Group 1 (embedded objects-based features) implies counting the frequent use of an object, which executes the file system input and output on the user's computer. This object can be exploited by the phishers to control downloading and uploading the files to and from the computer during browsing and then distribute cookie files to the user's computer. Imitation and use of this feature has been highly occurred in both phish and suspicious websites so that it can be considered as the most significant feature for the novel phish detection. On the other hand, F24 is the feature with low occurrence rate in Group 1 (the number of out links), which implies it is highly occurring either in the phish websites or in the suspicious websites. However, its significance should be taken into account for further investigation to find whether or not it can be used to predict phishness through its combination with other features in one set. ii. Over the three investigated groups of features, Groups 1 includes features with higher occurrence rate than those in other groups. This implies that presence of some features in Group 1 is highly important for further investigation as a deceptive feature that might be exploited in novel phishes. This is due to the fact that most of the targets of phishes are website logins, which enable the phishers to acquire the user's credentials. iii.
These websites may deploy the embedded objects, scripts and components to develop replicas of the legitimate websites and redirect their visitors to the fake websites by including external links and modifying some attributes to the input passwords. In addition, they may be used to download suspicious files, codes and cookies from the Internet, executing ActiveX controls as a class ID of some built-in objects, executing shell instructions during web browsing, compromising webpages and redirecting users to the exploited servers. iv.
Some features included in Group 2 have high occurrence rate, which implies that phishes can exploit them to inject packed and obfuscated scripts using a client side scripting language, such as the JavaScript. Features of Group 1 were the most contributing features due to their F-measure value, which denotes their effectiveness in prediction. Group 2 composed of features with less contribution than those of Group 1, whereas the URL features of Group 3 had the least contributions. iii.
Features in Group 1 achieved higher prediction accuracy (i.e. F-measure) with relatively minimum rate of FP and FN. This infers that these feature types could be improved towards ranking their detection capability against the novel phishes to decrease both FP and FN. However, in practice, it is hard to perfectly predict novel phishness based on one type of feature, which may be the result of impure analysis of features exploited by all the novel phish websites. iv.
Combining all the extracted features in Group 4 reveals that they could increase the prediction accuracy without compromising the rates of FP and FN. The reasonable rate of FP and FN was achieved due to the use of multiple types of features that did not entirely overlap. Furthermore, the prediction accuracy could be improved by filtering all of these features into a subset of features that were fewer in number and the highest in relevance to the novel phishness indication. v.
Overall, results demonstrate the potential discrimination and holistic characterization that a large scale set of hybrid features could afford to outfit novel and prevalent phish website classification
In short, the aforesaid observations implied that despite of their frequently occurrence over the experimental dataset, examined features are varied in their co-occurrence values. Therefore, those investigated features should be taken into account in the classification of novel phish websites because they may be crafted in phish websites frequently for deception purpose in the future case of web data.
Comparative Analysis
Some related works adopted different sets of generic phishing features to detect phish websites but their proposal did not contribute well to novel phishness prediction. To restate the difference in features and their classification outcomes between our work and some of the most renowned related works, Table 6 gives an overview of the previously used features and the proposed ones with respect to the number of features, and their categories. Regarding Table 6 , it is observed that fewer and more different phishing features were investigated by the comparable works [11, 22, 23] in contrast to features proposed in this paper. In [11, 22, 23] , the generic features were normally extracted from the URLs and HTML documents or the sources codes of the phish webpages. Moreover, 3 rd party features are also used as supplementary features to determine discrepancies between the phish and legitimate websites with the aid of external resources and search engines for page ranking, verification of domain name systems (DNSs), and target website identification (WHOIS). Such features may not contribute the characterization of novel phish website due to their inconsistencies, computational costs, and their evasion by novel phishes. Regarding Table 6 , the authors in [11] used two HTML features extracted from the input and login form as well as ten URL features with three features related to the third parties (e.g. WHOIS and Google page rank).
In [22] , nine URL features and eight HTML features were extracted from the title, image, input and text tags. They were used with one page rank feature by Google search engine. On the other hand, researchers in [23] proposed five HTML features, such as those related to the input and login forms, seven URL features related to patterns, symbols, number of dots, sensitive words, IP address and multiple TLDs as well as those extracted using the page rank of search engine as the third party features. Whereas, this work particularly identified 58 hybrid features extracted from the nodes of DOM tree and they include some native functions, attachment events, methods, attributes and other elements related to the embedded components and scripts inlines of the website's source codes.
With the perspective of phishing classification outcomes, an assessment was attained across the experimental dataset by using our proposed features and those used in the aforesaid comparable works as shown in Figure 8 . Figure 8 plots the classification outcomes in terms of the rates of false positive (FPR) and false negative (FNR) as well as true positive rate (TPR). Also, the classification outcomes are reported across the experimental dataset which was divided into three datasets: Dataset1 for training, Dataset2 for validating and Dataset3 for testing. Results plotted in Figure 8 , showcase that the proposed features in this work achieved the best cases of TPR, FPR and FNR in contrast to those features adopted in [11, 22, 23] . This is due to their large number, their newly deployment, and their hybridity which attained more holistic prediction on almost phish websites on the experimental dataset. Indeed, more sophisticated features of hybrid feature category such as embedded objects features, XSS based features, and language independent features could successfully classify novel phish web websites. Despite the proposed hybrid set of features, the features set adopted in [11] reported lower TP with higher FP and FN because of its smaller number of features. Moreover, such features have less divergence with respect to their types and features particular categories that might fall short to detect novel phishes effectively on the dataset. Besides, the experimental dataset is of imbalanced class distribution in phishing and legitimate websites so that new phishing deceptions can be misclassified. Therefore, the features set of [11] lacked adaptation to novel phish websites. Whereas, the features set that adopted in [22] , maintained a relatively noticeable rise due to their partial classification of phish websites across the datasets that varied in their class distribution and web page exploits. However, their results revealed their inability to characterize more advanced phishing deceptions. Similarly, features adopted by Xiang et al. [23] yielded the worst case of classification performance across the datasets amongst those of other related works. Such unacceptable classification outcomes among the others pointed out the partial characterization of the aforesaid features against novel phish websites as well as their partial covering up newly collected, larger in size, and more varied in class distribution datasets.
Future Work
Based on the aforesaid observations, this sub-section gives an insight on facets to be considered for future research:
i. Exploring and employing new phishing features can possibly yield valuable information to detect novel variants of phishes used by the phishers to bypass the existing anti-phishing campaign. Also, they will provide significant drive to the Internet phishing mitigation. ii.
Highly contributing features are extracted from the website content, such as the functional components, objects, elements, native functions of scripting language. These features are highly expected to be exploited by the phishers due to their functionalities in modification, imitation, redirection and injection of codes and links towards obtaining the user's confidential information. Furthermore, they could be assigned to more than one type of novel phishes. iii.
It is observed that the use of hybrid features in Group 4, could improve the detection accuracy against the novel phishes. Features of Group 4 perfectly indicate the effects of hybrid features on increasing the phishness prediction accuracy due to the reduced overlap and increased assignment of the hybrid features to more than one pattern of novel phish. iv.
The major issue that should be considered in using the hybrid features is the computational time and cost. Through the machine learning algorithms or classifiers, the use of 58 hybrid features may have negative impacts on the time and execution during extraction, training and testing over large data sets. v.
Another issue that should be considered is that phishness prediction using a classifier like SVM mainly depends on the web content quality and quantity of the collected data set. More precisely, the websites used for the training on the classifier could represent the deceptive features exploited in either collected phish or suspicious websites. Thus, the data set may affect the accuracy of classifier and thereby, the results of the novel phishness prediction. vi.
To avoid negative impacts caused by the dimension of features space (58 hybrid features), further improvements are needed to reduce the dimension of features space as well as the complexity and time of phishness prediction over a large data set in real life application. vii.
The above-mentioned empirical features assessment approach yields that all extracted hybrid features can be adopted for the novel phishness prediction, which is the major trend of the current research trend. But some of these features may have negative impacts on the overall detection, including the computational cost, specificity and sensitivity, due to their difference in significance. Thus, further evaluation is needed to identify the optimal combination of these features and obtain a set of potential features that are hard to exploit by the phishers for bypassing the existing anti-phishing campaign.
Overall, they principal inductive factor of a classification based detection method is the features in use. Moreover, to optimize the classification based detection method for novel phish website detection, both holistic characterization on phishing deceptions and accurate classification on novel phish patterns are the most striking merits that should be considered carefully. To attain these merits, novel, hybrid, and discriminative features are required to explore and assess frequently.
As such, the detection method could yield effective performance in the real time experience. To this end, we believe that our proposed features as demonstrated experimentally are promising to extend and optimize those classification based detection methods of limited detection scope. Furthermore, the introduced criteria could promote the assessment and the selection of the most discriminative features from a large scale space of hybrid features testified herewith experimentally. Consequently, a phishing filtering engine could be upgraded in terms of its inductive parameters and its performance toe configure resilient defense against evolving phishes.
CONCLUSIONS
One of the main motivations behind conducting this work, was to introduce new features (58 features) for more holistic characterization of phish website patterns and more accurate classification of the novel ones. Other motivation was to investigate the causality between the proposed features (as the primary inductive factors) and the performance of classification based detection method. All experimentations, assessments and their relevant findings gave a proof-check of features' contributions to phishing classification due to their high exploitations on phish websites and their prediction susceptibility on novel phish websites.
Accordingly, the proposed features are recommended as promising factors to extend the limited scope of the currently available phishing filters and improve their performance with minimal misclassification error on novel phish websites. On the other hand, pursuing the introduced assessment criteria could also promote the detection strategy with the perspective of features selection. They could produce the most discriminative compactness of features for more accurate classification results. Based on the presented findings, it was found that the hybridization of features of multiple categories would complement their contributions on effective phishing classification. Moreover, it was revealed that features varied in their discriminating power on phishing classification as well as their diversity in phishing frequent exploitations. Such observation gives a global view on two important facets: (i) hybrid features provide holistic description of phish websites that crafted in different types of features and then minimize the rate of false detections, (ii) selecting the most discriminative features is merely significant to obtain more accurate detection results and to minimize false detections, and (iii) exploring new features frequently is essential to obtain effective detection outcomes and thwarting novel phish websites.
Thus, further improvements can be made to select the most contributing features and discarding the least contributing ones with the aid of feature selection method for more efficient anti-phishing technique. 
